RE: Amoeba croaks -

From: Jacques Bailhache <>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 1999 15:26:15 -0000

Hi Bruno,

You said :
>machines are able to know much more than they are able to proof or
I know that any machine or formal system has a Godel proposition which
express it own non-provability, and therefore is true but not provable if
the system is consistant. But shouldn't we consider that the machine really
know something with certainty only if it can prove it ?

>Indeed my work show (or at least intend to show)
>that once we take seriously mechanist hypothesis then we have no
>choice than to derive the physical laws from a kind of abstract
>psychology which is itself derivable from computer science or
It seems clear to me that the physical laws are mathematical.
But do you want to derive only the physical laws of OUR universe ?
It seems to me that each mathematical theory could generate a physical
universe since this theory generates spirit which perceive this theory as
its universe, which means according to my idea that this theory is in fact
defined by an infinite sequence of theories which is not finitely


Metaphysical reflections
<> - Hypothesis
of mathematical universes
At the beginning was nothing. But this nothing has a structure which is
studied by mathematics. Mathematical truths are universal. They are true in
our universe, but also in any universe, and would remain true even if there
were no universe.
This structure contains infinite <naturesp.htm> mathematical models
xt/reflmph/english/glish/regul.htm> that we can define as limits of infinite
converging sequences of finite models which realize successive
approximations more and more precize, in the same way we can define real
numbers as limits of converging sequences of rational numbers.
We can virtually consider that any mathematical model generates a universe,
but this universe really exists only if it contains spirit that perceives it
<>. According
to the fundamental metaphysical principle, every infinite mathematical model
generates spirit perceiving this model as an external reality constituting
the physical universe in which this spirit lives
This idea has been feeled by the polish science-fiction novelist Stanislas
Lem in the short novel titled "Profsor A. Donda" ("The professor A. Donda").
The existence of an infinity of mathematical models yields to the existence
of an infinity of universes
<>. Each of these
universes, including of course our universe, would then be the
materialization of a mathematical model, or rather what we perceive as a
materialization, because in fact everything would be only relationship
between mathematical beings.
We will now examine the consequences of this hypothesis of mathematical
universes, trying to answer to some metaphysical interrogations at the light
of this hypothesis.
This hypothesis of mathematical universes gives a new lighting
<> on the
non-determinism of quantum physics when the wave function collapses and
about the many worlds hypothesis.

After having written this text and having heared some comments about it, my
idea evolved concerning the concept of nothing : if nothing contains
everything, it is not really nothing. It could be seen as a proof by
absurdity that there cannot be nothing.


Jacques Bailhache
Y2K Centre of Expertise (BRO)
DTN: 856 ext. 7662
Tel: +32-2 729.7662, Fax: +32-2 729.7985
Visit my home page :

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Marchal []
> Sent: Thursday, January 14, 1999 10:24 AM
> To: Gilles HENRI
> Cc: ''
> Subject: RE: Amoeba croaks -
> Hi Gilles
> > What do you think of the
> >phenomenological relevance of mechanism? That is, leaving completely
> aside
> >the question of consciousness, do you think that known physical laws,
> >applied to our collection of neural cells in interaction with the outer
> >world, can reproduce our external behaviour, including language, artistic
> >creations, etc?
> I see things the other way round. I do believe in the relevance of
> mechanism for both behaviour or even consciousness. For exemple
> consciousness is linked to the facts that (self-referentially correct)
> machines are able to know much more than they are able to proof or
> communicate. This follow almost easily when (unlike Lucas or Penrose) we
> agree that incompleteness phenomenon apply to us.
> But, unlike most physicist, I do not take matter or physical laws (known
> or unknown) for granted. Indeed my work show (or at least intend to show)
> that once we take seriously mechanist hypothesis then we have no other
> choice than to derive the physical laws from a kind of abstract
> psychology which is itself derivable from computer science or number
> theory.
> To put it roughly : I think that the question of relevance of mechanism
> is the question of explaining how (appearance of) matter and time
> (including neural cells, brains, bodies) emerges on purely number
> theoretical relations.
> Bye. Bruno
Received on Thu Jan 14 1999 - 08:17:06 PST

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