On Sun, Mar 01, 1998 at 05:46:05PM -0800, Nick Bostrom wrote:
> And we assume that the people in these two universes know all this,
> right? (Otherwise their rational subjective probabilities could be
> anything, depending on what disinformation we give them.)
Yes.
> > A2. If I observe heads at time 1, at time 2 I will observe heads with
> > probability 1.
>
> This is what want to dispute. If I observe heads at time 1 there is a
> 2/3 chance that I observe heads at time 2. This might sound
> paradoxical, but the strangeness, I suspect, comes from the fact that
> the normal conditions for thinking about personal identity are not
> satisfied when there exist several copies of one mind.
How does 2/3 follow from definition A? At time 2, there are two
continuations of the experimenter who observes heads at time 1: the
original and the clone, both observing heads. So according to definition A
the probability that he will observe heads at time 2 is 2/2 = 1.
Received on Sun Mar 01 1998 - 18:40:52 PST
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